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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares and examines the effectiveness of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) dispute settlement 
mechanisms in resolving international intellectual property disputes. It focuses on the 
comparison and examination of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and 
the WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Rules. 
This paper argues that in the resolution of international intellectual property disputes the 
WIPO dispute settlement mechanism protects the development interests of developing 
countries more adequately than the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Ultimately, it 
concludes and strongly argues that in the resolution of a dispute between states, the 
effectiveness of a dispute settlement mechanism of an international organisation can not 
be merely measured from its legalistic approach and strong enforcement mechanism, 
but more fundamentally, such a mechanism must also have the ability to produce a 
settlement that protects and promotes the development interests of the states. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography ) 
comprises approximately 15,500 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International trade has entered the most liberal era in its history. A state can now easily 
trade with other countries. Technical and non-technical barriers to international trade 
have been removed. A state cannot adopt domestic policies that injure other states' 
economic interests, otherwise it would face trade sanction or retaliation from those 
states. 
However, trade disputes between states cannot be avoided. One state's interests may 
conflict with other states'. Each state has its own political and economic agenda in its 
international trade policies. These state agenda may trigger international disputes if they 
fail to comply with the agreed world trade norms. 
The liberalization of trade, therefore, contains the potential for conflict between states or 
private parties. In particular, international disputes would be likely to occur when 
international trade activities involve exploitation of intellectual property rights. These 
disputes, perhaps, are caused by different and conflicting interests of the states in the 
policy of intellectual property rights protection. The recent trade disputes involving 
copyright in computer software between China and United States demonstrate such a 
conflict of interests. China probably wants greater access to the technology for making 
this software. Moreover, by making and selling counterfeit software the Chinese might 
also benefit from cheaper software and from greater employment opportunities. The 
United States, on the other hand,want to maintain their product competitiveness and 
trade leverage in the world markets. They also probably want to monopolise and control 
the use of their technology. 
By retaliating and stopping trade relation, the disputes between China and the United 
States, if not resolved, may harm the economic development of those countries. 
Therefore, it is important to formulate effective dispute resolution in international 
intellectual property rights. 
This paper compares and examines the effectiveness of the WTO and WIPO dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the resolution of international intellectual property disputes. 
This paper argues that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism fails to balance the 
interests of developing and developed countries; it fails to protect and support 
developing countries' trade and economic interests fairly, thus creating an unequal and 
unjust world trade system and economic order. 
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By contrast, this paper argues that the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism better 
serves those developing countries' interests. However, to be effective, this mechanism 
should be able to promote the protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
world. It should be capable of producing mutually acceptable solutions. Ultimately, if 
the disputes involve developing countries, it should respect and promote the 
development interests of those countries. 
This paper consists of eight parts. Part II describes and identifies the need for effective 
protection of international intellectual property rights. It particularly identifies the 
motives of developed and developing country policies for the protection of intellectual 
property. It argues that one should employ different approaches to effectively resolve 
intellectual property disputes involving those countries. 
Part III explores the possibility of using 'alternative' dispute resolution procedures in 
resolving intellectual property disputes. It may form a basis for the theoretical 
frameworks in the analysis of the WTO and WIPO dispute settlement mechanisms. It 
argues that to use these procedures effectively one should be able to analyse the nature 
of these procedures and identify any difficulties to their uses. 
Part IV analyses and examines the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, as ruled in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), in the resolution 
of international trade disputes involving intellectual property. It argues that even though 
the mechanism is of a legalistic nature and a powerful enforcement mechanism, it fails 
to accommodate and promote the interests of developing countries. Consequently, it 
fails to create the world trade system that advances the creation of a more just and equal 
international economic order. 
Assessment of the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism in the resolution of international 
intellectual property disputes is discussed in Part V. This part focuses on the WIPO 
Mediation and Arbitration Rules. It suggests that the mechanism would be effective if it 
satisfied three criteria. First, it should be able to promote the protection of intellectual 
property internationally. Second, the mechanism should have the ability to produce 
solutions which are mutually acceptable to the parties. Finally, if the disputes involve 
developing countries, the mechanism should be able to accommodate the interests of 
those countries. 
Part VI compares the WTO and WIPO dispute settlement mechanisms. It argues that the 
WIPO dispute settlement mechanism better serves and protects the development 
interests of developing countries in the protection of intellectual property rights. 
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Finally, Part VII presents a case study to practically assess the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the WTO and WIPO dispute settlement mechanisms in the 
resolution of international intellectual property disputes. 
II. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION 
Intellectual property disputes1 would be more effectively resolved if the motives and 
needs for intellectual property protection are identified. Each state has its own motives 
and policies for such protection, depending on the role of intellectual property in its 
economic development. For industrialised countries, intellectual property plays a 
significant role in their economic development since their patented technology has 
increasingly contributed to their products' competitiveness in the global markets. Such 
protection would also maintain the monopolistic advantages of their products and 
services. They can control the competitors from competing with their products and 
services. 
On the other hand, intellectual property may not significantly contribute to the 
developing countries' economic development. They do not have their own technology 
for their industrial development, consequently, they may be disinclined to protect 
intellectual property rights adequately. However, to attract foreign investment, 
developing countries should implement effective intellectual property laws and 
enforcement. 
In a more economically interdependent world, many countries now open their doors to 
foreign investment. Any country that isolates its economic policy from economic 
relations with other countries would face difficulties in its economic development. 
Therefore, countries should implement a pragmatic economic policy so that they can 
benefit from the liberalization and globalization of trade and investment. For example, 
developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam and China have benefited from trade 
globalization by implementing open economic policies for foreign investment. Many 
foreign and multinational companies have now invested their money and technology in 
these countries. 
However, investment in intellectual property in a foreign country could have legal 
risks if not planned strategically. Therefore, foreign companies should be aware of the 
A dispute is defined as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or 
interests between two persons' [or states] . See Christine Chinkin Third Parties in 
International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1993) 15. 
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host country's intellectual property laws. Companies like McDonalds and Toyota, for 
example, should know the procedures to register their trademarks and patents in 
Indonesia if they want to license their trademarks and patents rights to local companies. 
Not all countries give proper protection to foreign intellectual property rights. 
Therefore most developed countries, such as the U.S.A, request countries which do not 
protect their intellectual property rights properly to change their laws. It may be 
understood that the effective protection of the developed countries' intellectual property 
rights will maintain their trade leverage and product competitiveness. One author 
describes the motives of developed countries in the protection of intellectual property:2 
Some analysts interpret the growing concern of industrialised country nations with intellectual 
property rights as an attempt to control the diffusion of new technologies or "as a weapon in the 
struggle of the 'haves' against "have not'. Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the industrialised 
countries would be to freeze the existing international division of labor by way of the control of 
technology transfer to the Third World. 
These motives can be understood as technology plays an important role in the 
industrialised countries' economic development. Efficient technology increases their 
product competitiveness in the global markets . Furthermore they have spent much 
money investment in the invention. So, economic reasons are the principal motives of 
the industrialised countries for the protection of intellectual property rights. 
To ensure effective intellectual property protection, governments should systematically 
integrate their intellectual property and international trade policy. The United States 
Government, for instance, bases this integration on the following principles:3 
(1) trade and intellectual property rights are part of a common set of policies that must be 
integrated in the interest of maintaining United Stated competitiveness; 
(2) the United States should insist on the application and enforcement of certain minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection in all countries in which the United States is 
commercially engaged; 
(3) trade and other commercial concessions that the United States grants other countries should be 
conditioned upon adherence to these standards; and 
(4) international agreements should embody these minimum standards and ensure that they are 
enforceable as a matter of both domestic and international law. 
The United States' policy, however, may have adverse impacts on the developing 
countries' economic development. Developing countries' exports to the United States 
and other developed countries rely heavily on the trade concessions. The integration 
policy would allow the United States to withdraw its trade concessions granted to 
developing countries if these countries did not protect the United States' intellectual 
2 
3 
Carlos Alberto Primo Braga "Merger or Marriage Convenience" (1989) 22 Vanderbilt J 
Trans L 252. 
Above n2, 226. 
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property adequately. Furthermore, developing countries' economic development 
depends on the use of the industrialised countries' high technology. Developing 
countries would face stagnation in their economic development if developed countries 
did not transfer their technology to developing countries. 
In the final analysis, different approaches should be employed to settle intellectual 
property disputes involving developing and developed countries. Motives for 
intellectual property protection and policy should be identified to determine which 
approaches or which dispute resolution procedures would be the most effective to 
resolve the disputes. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 
Various dispute resolution procedures can be used to resolve international intellectual 
property disputes. However, to use these procedures effectively, one should firstly 
analyse the nature of the procedures so that any areas of difficulties can be identified 
and, in certain circumstances, avoided. 
A. Negotiation 
One author defines negotiation as "a process whereby the parties directly communicate 
and bargain with each other in an attempt to agree on a settlement of the issue".4 Given 
the advantages of negotiation in settling disputes, parties or nations prefer to negotiate 
their disputes rather than use other procedures for dispute settlement for the following 
reasons:5 
4 
5 
( 1) Negotiation is the least risky way of trying to dealt with disputes. Each country [ or party] has 
maximum control over both the dispute settlement process and outcome, since it always has 
the option of simply walking away from the negotiation and not agreeing. In contrast, any 
type of third-party involvement carries a risk of reducing a country's flexibility and freedom to 
do what it wants, and of somehow trapping it into an undesirable outcome. 
(2) Negotiation places responsibility for resolving the disputes on the parties themselves, who are 
in the best position to develop a sensible, workable and acceptable solution. Sometimes, the 
adage "too many cooks may spoil the broth" is applicable to international dispute resolution. 
(3) Since any settlement reached by negotiation is presumed to be freely agreed to by the parties 
to the dispute, rather than imposed on them by third parties, it is likely to have maximum 
acceptability and stability. 
(4) Negotiation favours compromise and accommodation between the parties-a "give- and-take" 
rather than "all-or-nothing" solution-which is most likely to preserve good long term 
cooperative relations. 
Richard B. Bilder "An Overview of International Dispute Settlement" (1986) 1 J. Int'l D.R.22. 
Richard B Bilder, above n4, 22-23, at footnote n36. 
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(5) Negotiation is generally simpler and less costly than other alternative dispute settlement 
methods and it can more easily be carried on secretly or without publicity. Moreover, the 
process of negotiation can develop attitudes , procedures and relationship that foster 
cooperation and dispute management between the parties generally. 
However, negotiation is not without risks. In international intellectual property disputes 
where one party has stronger bargaining power than another party, a settlement of the 
disputes may give more benefits to the stronger party. In patent licence disputes, for 
instance in aircraft industries, licensors may dictate the outcome of the settlement. 
Licensees, whose business of manufacturing the aircraft is heavily dependent on the 
patent, may negotiate their interests with the licensors but from a position of 
weakness. The licensees are placed in a situation where they cannot negotiate their 
options freely. They are threatened by the possibility of losing the patent licence or 
discontinuing their beneficial business relationship with the licensors. Consequently, 
the licensees, if there are no alternative means of protecting their interests, have to 
accept the licensors' options. 
Furthermore, in negotiation "[a] party may not be willing to negotiate and compromise 
what it considers an issue of 'principle"' .6 For example, in a joint venture contractual 
dispute involving pharmaceutical patent processes, the principal company may be 
reluctant to disclose the trade secret in the negotiation processes, even though this issue 
is central to settling the dispute. Disclosing the trade secret may reduce the bargaining 
power of the principal company to negotiate future agreements with the subordinate 
company. As a result this tendency may end in an ineffective dispute settlement. 
Consequently, future disputes may arise since the root causes of the problem were not 
dealt with properly . 
Negotiation may also not effectively dispose of disputes as "[t]he parties' negotiating 
procedures and resources may not be adequate to develop mutually agreed facts or data 
instrumental for a potential solution of the dispute" .7 In international intellectual 
property disputes, accurate and complete data are the keys for an effective resolution. 
For example, in international patent licence disputes concerning the licensee's claim to 
an invention based on the patented technology, negotiators could not settle the dispute 
effectively without the licensee's willingness to disclose the invention. 
Negotiators need complete data and descriptions of the invention. They need these data 
to assess the novelty, applicability and inventiveness of the invention. However, from 
the licensee's perspective and interest, disclosing such data would be considered an act 
6 
7 
Richard B Bilder, above n4, 23, footnote n36 (4). 
Above n4, 23, footnote n36 (5). 
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to communicate the invention to the public. As a result of this publication, the invention 
would not be considered 'new'. Consequently, the licensee's patent application for the 
invention may be refused by the Patent Office. 
To overcome this difficulty, negotiators may make an undertaking to keep the invention 
secret. The licensee may require the licensor not to publicise the invention to the public 
or use the confidential information for his or her commercial purposes. 
Furthermore, to negotiate the interests and differences in international intellectual 
property disputes effectively, negotiators may apply a negotiation method, as one 
author suggests:8 
People: Separate the people from the problem. 
Interests: Focus on interests, not positions. 
Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. 
Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 
Negotiators should be able to focus on and assess the problem objectively. They should 
identify and consider the parties' needs and interests and offer possible solutions that 
satisfy these interests. However, to be mutually acceptable to the parties, these 
solutions should be based on objective criteria. Furthermore, negotiators should be 
able to find out "[w]here do joint gains from cooperation really come from?"9 
An effective negotiator must have specific skills, the most imprtant of which are: 10 
I. Preparation and planning skill; 
2. Ability to express thoughts verbally; 
3. Knowledge of subject matter being negotiated; and 
4. Ability to think clearly and rapidly under pressure and uncertainty. 
In intellectual property disputes, a negotiator should know technical, legal and 
commercial aspects of intellectual property to enable her or him to approach and solve 
the problem effectively. 
Procedures used in negotiation processes should be designed to produce a 'win-win 
solution' to the dispute. These procedures should be created so that the imbalance of 
power between the disputants can be reduced. In international intellectual property 
disputes negotiation involving developing and developed countries or private parties 
from both countries, a formal procedure may be a better alternative for developing 
8 
9 
10 
Roger Fisher et al Getting to Yes Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in (Arrow Book 
Ltd, London, 1987). 
DA Lax & JK Sebenius The Manager as Negotiator (Free Press/Macmillan, NY,1986) 88. 
Howard Raiffa, The Art & Science of Negotiation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1982) 120. 
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countries. They may " ... seek more formal negotiating forums and strengthen their hand 
through organisation" .11 Formal forums, such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), would enable the 
parties to create a more acceptable solution. However, developing countries would 
only benefit from these forums if the rules and procedures for negotiation serve their 
interests. 
Cultural differences in international negotiation 
Another important factor that may have significant impacts on the outcome of 
negotiation processes in international intellectual property disputes is cultural 
differences between the parties. "Do people from different cultures have a different 
conception of the function of negotiation? Do they negotiate differently?" 12 
Indonesian parties, for example, would communicate their needs and interests in a more 
indirect way than Westeners. Therefore, the counterparts should analytically explore 
what the Indonesian parties really want: 'what is the real intention behind their words?'. 
In Indonesian cultures, direct and extreme criticism is something that should be avoided 
when resolving disputes. Instead, Indonesians would appreciate the criticism if the 
counterpart expressed this criticism in an indirect and polite way. For instance, in 
patent licence disputes where the Indonesian party is the licensee, the counterpart 
should not say :" Your invention is invalid. You have unlawfully broken the contract!"; 
Instead, say "We respect and are proud of your achievement and efforts. However, 
your formulae have similarity to ours. Let us examine it. We hope we are wrong". 
Thus, respect first, then state your criticism politely and indirectly. 
Indonesians lack the training and inclination needed to make verbal arguments. 
However, they are good at using non-verbal language to communicate. The ability to 
debate and argue a different point of view is not well developed in Indonesian culture. 
For instance, children should not criticise their parents even if they are wrong. This 
cultural behaviour is brought to Indonesian political life. If people complain and 
criticise the government, they are charged as "enemies of the government ". This 
attitude, of course, influences how the Indonesians negotiate with other people. So, 
when negotiating with Indonesian parties, the counterpart party should be skilful in 
reading their body language. For an Indonesian party, silence does not mean 
agreement. 
II 
12 
I W Zartman & MR Berman The Practical Negotiator (Yale UP, 1982) 205. 
Above n 11, 224. 
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Ultimately, negotiation may effectively resolve international intellectual property 
disputes. However, negotiators should be aware of power imbalance, trade secrets or 
confidential information and cultural differences during the process. 
B. Mediation 
Generally mediation is defined as " ... a structured process involving a neutral third 
party, designed to discover the nature of a dispute, to consider options for its resolution 
and to reach a consensual settlement" .13So, there are six fundamental aspects of 
mediation. They are : 
1) A structured process; 
2) Involvement of a third party as a mediator in the process; 
3) Impartiality of the mediator; 
4) Discovery of the nature of a dispute; 
5) Consideration of the alternatives for dispute resolution; and 
6) A consensual settlement as the objective of mediation. 
The essential message of this notion is that however the process is structured it should 
be able to produce solutions which are mutually acceptable to the parties. In 
international intellectual property disputes involving parties from developing and 
developed countries, the structure of this process should accommodate both countries' 
policy objectives in the development of intellectual property law. 
This may be difficult since the two countries' policy objectives may have conflicting 
interests. For example, the developed countries' policy objective in protecting 
intellectual property is to maintain trade leverage by strictly controlling and 
monopolising the use and transfer of their technology to developing countries. By 
contrast, developing countries' objective is to have access to the technology for their 
economic development. The transfer of technology is one way to achieve this objective. 
To solve this dilemma, the structure of the process should be flexible enough to enable 
the parties to create the widest opportunity to reach a compromise. This "[f]lexibility is 
the keynote of mediation as a procedure for the settlement of dispute" .14The mediation 
13 
14 
Hilary Astor et al Dispute Resolution in Australia (Butterworths, Australia, 1992). See the 
definition in Folberg and Taylor Mediation, A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflict 
Without Litigation (Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 1984). 
Department of Study Group of the David Davis Memorial Institute of International Studies 
International Disputes the Legal Aspects (Europa Publication, London, 1972) 84. 
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should not be so rigidly ruled, as to reduce the parties' autonomy to reach a mutually 
acceptable settlement. Furthermore, flexible processes may make the parties more 
confident and comfortable with the outcome. 
Another central issue in the mediation process is the role of the mediator in the 
settlement of a dispute. A mediator has two functions in the settlement of disputes 
involving state parties: 15 
(l) The procedural function: the conduct of interstate negotiations over a dispute is inherently a 
difficult process; neither side wishes to show weakness ... A mediator is able to introduce new 
elements in the discussion. He [or she] can put forward new ideas, discuss them with the 
parties in dispute separately, or put forward an idea suggested by one side without disclosing 
its origin .. .In general, his [or her] participation can loosen up the course of the negotiations 
and thus assist in the production of an acceptable solution. 
(2)The substantive function: ... , a solution of the substance of the dispute may be acceptable 
simply because it is the mediator's proposal. That it comes from the mediator may be relied 
on as showing that it is a just solution or at least a reasonable compromise ... Naturally, how 
far a mediator can thus lend weight to a given solution will depend on how far he [she] 
personally or the State has a reputation for justice and can be seen to be impartial... 
In international intellectual property disputes between developing and developed 
countries, to carry out his or her procedural function the mediator should be able to 
disclose the parties' undisclosed information. The mediator may identify and clarify 
the parties' sentiments and emotions that are not revealed in the parties' negotiation 
process. This hidden information may be important in the settlement of the disputes. 
Furthermore, in certain circumstances during the negotiation process a party may not 
be able to express his or her feelings freely to its counterpart. These may be negative 
feelings that may a negative influence on the outcome of the process. These feelings 
may also cause communication difficulties; Therefore, "[t]he mediator, someone skilled 
in communication techniques, can intervene with some degree of success, ... "16to 
assist the parties. 
These negative feelings, for example, may manifest themselves in intellectual property 
disputes between states which have been political enemies for a long time. These 
feelings always make a party suspicious of any proposals initiated by the counterpart. 
The parties' past experience teache them not to believe their counterparts. 
Moreover, the political contents of international intellectual property policy may 
significantly contribute to these feelings. This policy may be seen by a party as a means 
15 
16 
Department of Study Group, above n14, 85 [emphasis added]. 
Mark Chupp in Martin Wright et al (eds) Mediation and Criminal Justice: Victims, 
Offenders and Community (Sage Publication, California, 1989) 66. 
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of achieving its counterpart's political objectives. For example, a state party may 
suspect its counterpart's motives for proposing to exclude military technology from the 
patent compulsory licensing. This party may think that such an exclusion would lessen 
its opportunities to have access to the military technology so that the counterpart may 
control the party's military power. So, negotiation between these parties may not 
produce positive outcomes without a neutral third party's involvement to disclose the 
party's negative feelings. 
The mediator may gather the information more effectively in private caucuses. In 
international intellectual property disputes involving trade secrets or confidential 
information, these private caucuses may be preferred. However, there are differing 
opinions on the use of this technique: 17 
Some mediators routinely use private caucuses in the information gathering stage of a mediation. 
In private caucus the mediator sees the parties separately to discuss any matter which they wish 
to mention privately and/or in confidence. Some mediators are opposed to the use of private 
caucus, believing that all issues should be openly discussed. 
Separate discussions between mediator and a party in intellectual property disputes 
involving trade secrets may enable the party to disclose these secrets without another 
party knowing this information. In certain circumstances this confidential information 
may be the key to the settlement of disputes. For instance, in disputes in the patent 
licensing of pharmaceutical technology processes, the licensor may not disclose the 
work of some parts of the technology that are not patented. These parts, however, may 
be the key to effectively describing the work of the patented technology. The disputes 
may not be able to be resolved without disclosing these parts. 
However, the use of private caucuses should not impair the neutrality of the mediator. 
The impartiality of the neutral third party or mediator is the central issue in mediation. 
To be neutral, it is important that "the mediator controls the process of the mediation, 
while the parties control the content and the outcome" .18 The power of the mediator, 
therefore, is limited by:19 
.. . his or her role, the nature of the mediation contract, the constraint facing the parties, the 
social structure within which the mediation occurs, and self imposed ethical restriction. 
Even though a mediator cannot impose solutions or decisions on the parties, he or she 
should be able to propose or offer possible solutions to the dispute. However, this role 
17 
18 
19 
Hilary Astor et al, above n13, 100. 
Above n 13, 102. 
Above n 13, 103, as quoted from Mayer. 
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may only be exercised if the parties agree on it. Furthermore, the parties should not be 
obliged to accept the mediator's proposal. 
In short, a mediator should use his or her power to control the process towards 
achieving a mutually acceptable settlement. To produce this settlement, the parties 
should be free to control the outcome of the mediation process. 
C. Arbitration 
Parties in international commercial disputes involving intellectual property may use 
arbitration as an alternative way of resolving their disputes. Compared to the use of 
national courts, there are some advantages in using arbitration to resolve international 
commercial transactions: 20 
(i) the parties involved are in a position to directly influence the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal and therefore may have more confidence in such a tribunal than in State courts; 
(ii) the parties are in position to appoint arbitrators who are familiar with and experienced in a 
particular kind of dispute; 
(iii) the rules governing arbitration are less rigid and formalistic and therefore may contribute to a 
settlement in a more peaceful climate; 
(iv) arbitration proceedings are, in general, less time consuming, since the arbitral award is to be 
considered as final and binding and therefore legal proceedings in several instances can be 
circumvented; 
(v) submission of international business disputes to arbitration rather than submission of the 
same to national courts creates, or at least enlarges, the possibility of applying rules and 
usages specifically attuned to international business transactions ... ; 
(vi) arbitral awards can often be enforced easier in a country other than the seat of the arbitral 
tribunal than court decisions, since quite a number of States, including both industrialised 
States and developing countries, are at present parties to the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; 
(vii) apart from arbitration as a means of settlement of disputes arising from international business 
transactions, arbitration is of increasing importance for the purpose of filling gaps in or 
modifying of international business contracts to changed circumstances, being tasks which 
are not always permitted to national courts 
The parties' autonomy in choosing arbitrators may have advantages and disadvantages 
for reaching an effective solution to the disputes. Since intellectual property disputes 
contain special technicalities, parties may choose arbitrators who are experienced and 
experts in the disputed subject matter. High technology patent disputes, for example in 
the automobile industry, need an arbitrator who has technical expertise in the mechanics 
of the automobile. He or she should also know how a patent works in the industry. As 
this expertise may not be available in national courts, this would cause ineffective and 
unjust resolution of the disputes. Therefore, arbitration could effectively resolve 
intellectual property disputes, particularly ones involving special technicalities. 
20 Leo J. Bouchez "The Prospect for International Arbitration: Disputes Between States and 
Private Enterprises" (1991) 8 J. Int'I Arb. 83. 
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On the other hand, in arbitration consisting of three arbitrators the third arbitrator of 
which is appointed by the two arbitrators, the parties' appointed arbitrators may have 
an impact on the neutrality of the arbitral process. For obvious reasons.the parties' 
appointed arbitrators tend to serve the parties' interests. 
A possible solution to this problem is to justify the arbitrators' act in serving and 
protecting the interests of the appointing parties. They may act as the parties' lawyers. 
Consequently, they may be partial. However, the third arbitrator must be impartial and 
have ultimate authority to decide the case. He or she acts as a judge, giving fair 
decisions. 
The finality of the arbitral award may also be questioned. The award is not always 
perfect, just, impartial and acceptable by the parties. As Deutsch states, "if the parties 
have no faith in the criteria or the arbitrator but are bound by the power vested in them, 
the issue will resurface in further conflicts and disputes". 21 Therefore, the parties 
should have opportunities to have the award reviewed. 
In New York State Arbitration Law, for example, an arbitral award may be vacated for 
the following reasons:22 
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or 
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the award was by confession; or 
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his power or so imperfectly 
executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or 
(iv) failure to follow the procedure ... , unless the party applying to vacate the award continued 
with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection. 
However, having recourse to national courts to re-examine the award would conflict 
with the parties' business interests. "The way courts are organized-number of judges, 
delay, appeals procedures, and technical rules-" 23is expensive and time-consuming. In 
intellectual property disputes these court proceedings may also disclose trade secrets 
and the confidentiality of information. A patent right may also be reassessed or 
revoked. The court proceedings may also destroy the parties' business relationship. 
Furthermore, publicity of the court proceedings may adversely affect the parties' 
business reputation. 
21 
22 
23 
Quoted in J Folberg & A Taylor "Nature of Conflict and Dispute Resolution Process" in 
J. Folberg & A.Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without 
Litigation (Jossey-Bass, I 984) 28. 
Robert Coulson, President American Arbitration Association, An Introduction to Commercial 
Arbitration (AAA, 1980) 27. 
Richard Neely Why Courts Don't Work (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983)10. 
14 
There should be a control mechanism to ensure the impartiality of the arbitrators. This 
mechanism should also protect the parties from the arbitrators abuse of power. The 
arbitrators may incorrectly apply the law to the disputes, creating an unjust award. The 
mechanism should be able to review and set aside such awards. However, the 
"[a]wards must be upheld as long as they are arguably based on the contract"24 and do 
not contravene domestic laws. 
However, this mechanism should be strictly used by the parties, particularly in settling 
international commercial disputes involving intellectual property rights. Only in a case 
where the parties' interests are adversely prejudiced by the award, may recourse to this 
mechanism be allowed. Frequent uses of this mechanism would, in certain 
circumstances, certainly conflict with the parties' business interests. They need an 
expeditious and inexpensive solution to their disputes. The use of the mechanism would 
mean delays and waste their time. It could also be a more expensive process. 
An alternative mechanism to review an arbitral award should be created. This could be 
an arbitration court of appeal. The rules and proceedings of this court should be like 
ones of other 'normal' arbitration tribunals: simple, flexible, confidential, expeditious 
and inexpensive. Parties may choose their own arbitrators to sit in the arbitration court 
of appeal; the third arbitrator may be from this court or be chosen by the parties' 
appointed arbitrators. However, parties may not rechoose the arbitrators who formerly 
resolved their disputes. The parties may also employ a group or a single arbitrator from 
the arbitration court of appeal. 
However, this arbitration court of appeal must be the ultimate institution for reviewing 
the arbitral awards. Its review and award must be final and binding. There is no 
opportunity for further reviews. National courts should recognise and execute its 
awards. 
24 Steven J. Burton "Combining Conciliation With Arbitration of International Disputes" (1995) 
18 Hastings In'! & Comp. L. Rev. 649. 
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IV.THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING (DSU)25 
A. The Mechanism 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism aims at securing a constructive solution to 
disputes between members of the WTO that serves the objectives of the WTO 
Agreements and is mutually acceptable to the parties.26 Compared to the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the GATT, " ... which suffers from ineffective enforcement 
of the existing rules" ,27 the DSU has more legalistic approaches and stronger 
enforcement mechanism to settle international trade disputes.28The DSU is also more 
innovative and has more detailed rules and procedures.29 Under the GATT, "[t]he fact 
that most complaints were concentrated among just a few of the largest and most 
powerful countries can be viewed as evidence that the dispute settlement system still has 
some weaknesses" .30 The GATT dispute settlement mechanism is "[o]ne of the mo[st] 
contoversial aspects of the GATT as an institution ... "31 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1994). 
This Understanding constitutes Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation, which was signed on 15 April 1994 and came into force on 1 January 
1995. [hereinafter referred to as "DSU"]. 
WTO Website, http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/webds.htm. 
John P. Byrley "Fats V. GAIT" (1991) 6Fla J.I.L. 328. 
Azar M. Khansari "Searching for the Perfect Solution" (1996) 20 Hasting Int'I & Comp. L. 
Rev 191. 
Norio Komuro "The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Coverage and Procedures of the 
WTO Understanding" ( 1995) 12 J.Int'I Arb.140. 
Robert E. Hudec Enforcing International Trade Law (Butterworths Legal Publisher, 1993) 295. 
John H. Jackson Restructuring the GA TT System (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1990) 59. 
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Under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs)32 
the DSU must be applied to settle intellectual property disputes between member states 
of the WT0.33 
The DSU proceeds through several phases: "consultation, a panel phase, Appellate 
Body review and as an optional alternative procedure, arbitration".34 
Consultation should be the first resort to resolving disputes between members. 
Member countries disputing measures that violate the covered agreements35 should 
"undertake to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for 
consultation ... "36 The requested country should reply to a request for consultation 
within 10 days and "enter into consultation in good faith within a period of no more 
than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually 
satisfactory solution".37 If the requested country does not respond to the request 
within these periods, the requesting country may ask the Dispute Settlement Body38 to 
establish a paneJ.39 
Thus, the DSU strictly limits the consultation periods. In international intellectual 
property disputes between developing and developed countries, this strict limitation 
may unfairly affect parties from developing countries when preparing strategies and 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
See WIPO, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1994 
(WIPO Publication, Geneva, 1996). [hereafter referred to as "TRIPs"]. The TRIPS Agreement 
is a multilateral agreement on intellectual property. This Agreement was concluded on 15 
April 1994 and came into force on 1 January 1995. It constitutes Annex IC of the Marrakest 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO). All members of the WTO must 
comply with this Agreement. 32 This Agreement essentially sets international minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection. It consists of 73 articles and contains provisions, 
inter alia, on copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, licences, criminal procedures and dispute settlement. 
See art. 64 of the TRIPs Agreement. 
Azar M Khansari, above n28, 191. 
See appendix 1 of the DSU. These Covered Agreements include, inter alia, the TRIPs. 
The WTO Understanding, art.4 (I), above n25. 
Above n25, art.4 (3) [emphasis added]. 
Reffered to in the DSU as the "DSB". This Body consists of representatives of the Members 
of the WTO. Its main responsibility is "to administer procedures of the WTO Understanding, 
the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements ... See Norio 
Komuro "The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Coverage and Procedures of the WTO 
Understanding", above n29, at 119. 
The DSB also has "the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body Reports, 
maintain surveillance of implementation of rullings and recommendations and authorize 
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements. See article 2 ( 1) 
of the DSU. 
The WTO Understanding, art.4 (3), above n25. 
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negotiation approaches in the consultation process. Developing countries may need 
longer time to prepare their resources adequately. They have special circumstances and 
difficulties in managing their resources. In certain circumstances, for example, the 
government of a developing country may need time to negotiate with domestic 
entrepreneurs who are alleged to have made counterfeit goods. If this allegation 
involves many domestic companies, the government may need more than 30 days to 
negotiate with them. If the complaining state requires the government to change the 
laws and protect its nationals' intellectual property rights in this country, the domestic 
companies may be closed and the employees may lose their jobs. The government 
should explain to the entrepreneurs the impacts of the government policies on their 
business lives. 
Therefore, the government should carefully consider the impacts of its policy if it 
should change the laws. It should anticipate the impacts of the closing of the 
companies on the people's social and economical lives. Consequently, these sensitive 
issues need more than 30 days in order to prepare strategies and resources adequately 
for the consultation process. This more reasonable time may enable developing 
countries to offer a range of options that not only satisfiy developed countries' 
interests but also serve their national interests. 
The DSU requires that a request for consultation must be in writing, must identify the 
measures, and indicate the legal basis for the allegation.40 "Consultation shall be 
confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further 
proceedings". 41 The complaining party may request the DSB to establish a panel if 
within 60 days after the date of the request for consultation a settlement to the dispute is 
not reached.42 
Confidentiality in the consultation and negotiation process is important to resolve 
international intellectual property disputes effectively. For instance, a developing 
country may implement measures that enable domestic manufacturers to use patented 
technology from developed countries. However, these domestic manufacturers may 
improve the patented technology and make an invention. Disclosure of the invention 
may jeopardise their rights for the invention. This disclosure may be considered as 
publication of the invention. This publication reduces the innovative aspect of the 
40 
41 
42 
The WTO Understanding, art.4 (4), above n25. 
Above n25, art.4 (6), [emphasis added] . This meeting must be convened within 15 days of the 
request. 
Above n25, art.4 (7) . 
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invention which is an important element for patenting it. As a result, the domestic 
manufactures may lose their rights if the consultation process is not confidential. 
The DSU further states that upon the request of the complaining party, the DSB must 
convene a meeting and establish a panel "unless at that meeting the DSB decides by 
consensus not to establish a panel".43Thus, the DSB has authority, by consensus, to 
refuse the request from the complaining party for the establishment of a panel. 
However, in practice a decision by consensus is difficult to reach since a member 
country of the DSB may have the same interests as those of the complaining party. 
Panels must refer to terms of reference established by the DSU:44 
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by 
the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document... and 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the 
rulings provided for in that/those agreement (s) 
However, within 20 days after the establishment of the panel, the disputants may 
exclude the terms. 
Members of panels must be governmental or non-governmental officials who are well 
qualified in international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements.45 
Appropriately qualified panellists are important for the settlement of international 
intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property disputes may not be effectively 
resolved if the panelists do not have the appropriate backgrounds and skills in legal, 
technical and commercial aspects of intellectual property. Furthermore, if the disputes 
involve patent issues the panelists should have technical backgrounds in the subject 
matter. 
However, compared to developed countries, developing countries may not have 
adequate human resources with strong background and experience in intellectual 
property issues. Most experts in international trade and intellectual property rights come 
from developed countries. Thus, developing countries may face a dilemma in the 
selection of the panelists. Panelists from developed countries may not be impartial or be 
influenced by their countries' interests or generally by other developed countries' 
interests. 
43 
44 
45 
The WTO Understanding, above n25, art.6 (1). [emphasis added]. 
Above n25, art.7 (1). 
Above n25 , art.8 (1). 
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On the other hand, developing countries may not want to choose panelists from 
developing countries as comparatively speaking, they may have inadequate expertise in 
the subject matter. The careful selection of panelists is, therefore, crucial for a 
favourable outcome for developing countries. 
The panelists "should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the 
members ... "46 Unless the disputants agree otherwise, citizens of member countries of 
the disputants must not serve as panelists.47 
The Secretariat has power to nominate panelists and the disputants "shall not oppose 
nominations except for compelling reasons" .48What is meant by 'compelling reasons' 
is not clarified. It is important that the Secretariat does not unilaterally interpret the 
meaning of 'compelling reasons'. There should be a clear and common understanding 
of what reasons may be considered as compelling so that the Secretariat cannot abuse 
the phrases. 
The Director General has power to appoint the panelists whom he or she "considers 
most appropriate ... ,"49 in case there is no agreement between the parties on the 
panelists within 20 days. Thus, the parties have autonomy to agree on the composition 
of the panelists. However, their autonomy is strictly limited by the DSU. 
The power of the Secretariat and the Director General to nominate and appoint the 
panelists may have damaging impacts on the interests of developing countries. The 
Secretariat and Director General may not be independent if developed countries have 
strong political influences in their selection. Because of these influences, they may 
prefer to advance their personal and developed countries' interests rather than those of 
developing countries. For example, in international intellectual property disputes 
involving patent rights in the pharmaceutical industry the Director General may 
appoint panelists from developed countries who have the same interests in the 
protection of patent rights in this industry. As a result the panel would produce an 
outcome that is partial and injurious to the interests of developing countries. 
A single panel may examine multiple complaints on the same subject matter from more 
than one Member.SO Its examination should not impair the rights of the parties if they 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
The WTO Understanding, art.8 (2), above n25. [emphasis added]. 
Above n25, art.8 (3). 
Above n25, art.8 (6). [emphasis added]. 
Above n25, art.8 (7) . 
Above n25, art.9 (1) . 
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request separate panels.51 During the process, the panel must consider "[t]he interests 
of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members".52 
However, it is better to examine international intellectual property disputes involving the 
same subject matter in separate panels. A single panel for multiple complaints may not 
effectively solve intellectual property disputes if these disputes involve trade secrets or 
confidential information. Parties may not want to disclose trade secrets or confidential 
information if they think they would lose their rights by disclosing the information. 
This would be likely to occur if the panel process involves multiple parties. 
Furthermore, if the dispute involves developing countries, they should be able to 
request separate panels for examining multiple complaints. It is most probable that in 
international intellectual property disputes, developing countries would be the defending 
parties since most developing countries are the users of the technology and the 
consumers of intellectual property products from developed countries. Thus, one 
developing country may face the same complaints from more than one developed 
country. For example, Indonesia faces the United States, Japan and the European 
Community in the Indonesian automobile case that involves trade and intellectual 
property dispute. In this case, Indonesia may suffer from an imbalance of power if the 
dispute is examined by a single panel. On the other hand, the complainants may 
increase their bargaining power as they have the same interests in the dispute. 
However, separate panels that examine multiple complaints over the same subject matter 
may degrade the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This occurs 
when the different panels produce inconsistent and diverse decisions on the same 
subject matter. To overcome this inconsistency, a subsequent panel should take into 
account the decision or report from the previous panel that examined the same subject 
matter. 
The panel has an important role in assisting the DSB to make its decision:53 
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this 
Understanding and the covered agreements ... , a panel should make an objective assessment of the 
matter ... , including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the 
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the ruling provided for in the covered 
agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the disputes and give them 
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. 
5 I 
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The WTO Understanding, above n25, art.9 (2). 
Above n25, art.10 (l).[emphasis added]. 
Above n25, art.11, above n25. [emphasis added] . 
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So, if the dispute, for example, is concerning a country's measure on parallel 
importation of patent products, the panel should assess the applicability and conformity 
of the measure with the TRIPs Agreement. To do this, the panel may investigate the 
case. The panel may ask the defending country to present the imported counterfeit 
patent products as evidence to be used in the panel process. Thus, the panel has 
investigative power. 
However, the panel should consult regularly with the parties. Thus, the DSU tries to 
accommodate the parties' interests and concerns in the panel's assessment. 
Furthermore, the DSU gives the parties opportunities to negotiate and settle their 
dispute during the panel process. The parties may choose their own solutions to the 
dispute. 
Confidentiality in the panel process is the key factor in the mechanism:54 
The panel shall meet in closed session. The parties to the dispute and interested parties shall be 
present at the meetings only when invited by the panel to appear before it. 
However, a closed session of the panel meeting may be questioned. Who will control 
the panel process? The panel may abuse its power during the process since this is not 
directly controlled by the public. A party may not be aware that in fact the panel does 
not respect the party's rights fairly . This could be avoided if the public can control the 
conduct of the panel. Therefore, parties should be able to choose whether a panel would 
be conducted in a closed or open session. 
Having considered the rebuttal submission and oral arguments from the parties, the 
panel must incorporate a factual and argumentative descriptive section in its report to the 
parties.55The panel must issue an interim report to the parties, informing them of its 
findings and conclusions to the parties' comments on the panel's description; the parties 
may ask the panel to review this report.56 This interim report will become the final 
report if the parties do not comment on it further. 
It is important that the parties should be able to comment on the panel's interim report 
because the panel may mistakenly interpret the facts and the parties' arguments. 
However, to what extent may the parties comment on the panel's interim report? Will 
the panel consider the parties' comments and change its interim report if it makes any 
mistakes? Could another party object to such changes? There should be a way of 
54 
55 
56 
The WfO Understanding, above n25, Working Procedures, Appendix 3(2). [emphasis added]. 
Above n25, art.15 (1). 
Above n25, art.15 (2). 
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preventing and correcting the panel's misinterpretation on the facts and the parties' 
arguments. However, this should not unnecessarily delay the panel process. 
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of the panel report to the Members of the 
WTO, the DSB must adopt the panel report if the parties do not appeal the report or the 
DSB "decides by consensus not to adopt it".57 This provision could be interpreted as 
meaning that even though the parties do not appeal to the panel report, the DSB must 
not adopt the panel report if all members of the DSB reject the panel report. 
The possibility of rejection of the panel report by the DSB may be seen as 
accommodating the interests of other members of the WTO. The panel report , which 
then will be used as a basis for making rulings and recommendations by the DSB, may 
have impacts on the interests of other member countries who are not directly involved in 
the dispute. This is clearly as a result of trade globalization where a country's trade 
measure which is directed to one particular country may also destructively affect other 
countries's trade interests. For example, a developing country may implement a policy 
excluding food and pharmaceutical products from the patent subject matter. The 
objective of this policy is to prevent the price of these products from increasing. 
However, this policy may contradict the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, upon a request 
from a complaining country, the panel may recommend that the defending country 
bring its policy into conformity with the TRIPs Agreement. Member of the DSB from 
developing countries who adopt the same policy may refuse this recommendation as it 
would establish an unfavourable precedent for them. 
Ironically, the DSU requires the DSB to decide by consensus for rejection of the panel 
report. Practically, this consensus may be difficult to reach because member countries 
of the DSB may have different interests in intellectual property policy. 
Since most of developing countries are the users of technology and consumers of 
intellectual property products and therefore are most likely to be the defending parties, 
the method of making decisions by consensus fails to protect the interests of developing 
countries. 
The DSU creates an appellate body, called Appellate Body, that has adjudicative power. 
This Body must be composed of seven persons appointed by the DSB.58Jt is important 
that the Appellate Body panelists "shall not participate in the consideration of any 
57 
58 
The WTO Understanding,art.16 (4), above n25. [emphasis added]. 
Above n25.art.17 (1) (2). 
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disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest". 59This Body must 
limit its consideration to legal issues and interpretations of the panel report.60 It "may 
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel". 61 The 
Appellate Body must draw up its working procedures after consulting the Chairperson 
of the DSB and the Director General.62Its proceedings must be confidential; ex parte 
communication with this Body concerning the issue is prohibited.63 
However, it is difficult to "distinguish questions of law from other questions 
(fact?).64This difficulty may trigger further disputes. Furthermore, in international 
intellectual property or TRIPs disputes an independent panel of the Appellate Body may 
be difficult to establish. There are two groups of countries in these disputes: first, 
developed countries as the exporters of intellectual property products and second, 
developing countries as the importers or consumers of these products. Therefore, a 
method of selecting the Appellate Body panelists which is based on geograpichal 
distribution may not solve the problem of the Body panel independency. To solve this 
difficulty, the seven Appellate Body panelists may be equally selected from developed 
and developing countries. However, they and their countries should not have 
conflicting interests in the disputes. 
As the parties have no autonomy in the formulation of the Appellate Body working 
procedures, the DSU diminishes the possibility of making a mutually acceptable 
solution. The parties do not have enough power to control the process and its outcome. 
As a result the DSU may produce a win-lose solution to the dispute. 
This adjudicative approach may protect intellectual property rights better. However, 
this approach may also harm the developing countries' development interests. For 
instance, strong enforcement of the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement may cause 
developing countries to lose their access to the patented technology. Therefore, it is 
important that enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement and other intellectual property 
conventions should consider the enforcement impacts on the broad development 
interests of developing countries. 
The DSU strictly limits the time period for the settlement of dispute. The maximum 
period for settlement of the dispute must not exceed nine months from the date of the 
59 
60 
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62 
63 
64 
The WTO Understanding, art.17 (3), above n25. 
Above n25, art.17 (6). 
Above n25, art.17 (13). 
Above n25, art.17 (9) 
Above n25, arts.17 (10) and 18 (1). 
Steven P. Croley et al "WTO Dispute Procedures Standard of Review"(l 996) 90 A.J.I.L. 195. 
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establishment of the panel until the date of the DSB consideration for the adoption of the 
panel report; this period is extended to 12 months if the parties appealed this report.65 
This strict time limitation may be able to reduce delays in the dispute settlement process. 
In international intellectual property disputes this delay may adversely increase the loses 
of income of a country which exports intellectual property products. For example, the 
United States lost a million dollars by China's delay in stopping its domestic 
manufacturers from making counterfeit compact discs and computer software. 
Therefore, strict and definite time limitation is important in resolving intellectual 
property disputes. The defending party may tend to delay the panel process if there is 
no time limitation for the settlement of the dispute. This time limit forces the parties to 
resolve the dispute. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism emphasises the importance of the party's 
compliance with the DSB rulings: "Prompt compliance with recommendations or 
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the 
benefit of all Members".66This provision reiterates the importance of the effective 
resolution of disputes in creating and maintaining the integrity of the world trade 
system. Effective resolution of the disputes is not only for the benefit of the parties 
involved but also for the benefit of all members of the WTO. In this context all 
members of the WTO may object to the rulings and recommendations of the DSB if 
these have damaging impacts on their interests. The party's autonomy, therefore, is 
limited by the interests of all members of the WTO. Consequently, even though the 
parties have mutually accepted a solution to the dispute, the implementation of this 
solution should not damage the interests of all members of the WTO. 
The DSU allows flexibility for the parties to comply with recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB. If 'the losing party' considers that it is impractical to implement the 
recommendation and rulings of the DSB immediately, it must be given a reasonable 
time to comply.67However, the DSU sets strict time limitation for the implementation 
of the DSB's recommendations and rulings:68 
65 
66 
67 
68 
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is approved 
by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval, 
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the disputes within 45 days after the date of 
adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement, 
The WTO Understanding, art.20, above n25. 
Above n25, art.21 (I). 
Above n25, art.21 (3). 
Norio Komuro, above n29, 153. [emphasis added] . 
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(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of 
adoption of the recommendations and rulings ... 
This strict time limit may effectively reduce the time taken by the losing party to 
implement the DSB rulings and recommendations. However, in determining the period 
of time for such implementation, special consideration should be given to developing 
countries. The DSB and the arbitration tribunal should consider in particular social, 
political and economical problems faced by developing countries. These problems may 
hinder developing countries from effectively implementing the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations. 
The provision also accommodates the interests of members concerned with the disputes 
by admitting them to propose the time period for the losing party to implement the DSB 
recommendations and rulings. This indicates that the implementation of the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations should not adversely affect the integrity of the world 
trade system. 
The DSU allows the 'winning' party to refer to the original panel if the losing party's 
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is not consistent with the 
disputed agreements.69 The DSB must "keep under.surveillance the implementation of 
the adopted recommendations or rulings".70 
Referral to the original panel may delay the implementation of the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB. Therefore, there should be a mechanism to avoid such delay and to 
force the 'losing' party to consistently comply with the covered agreements. This may 
be done by closely involving the DSB and increasing its role in the surveillance of the 
implementation of its recommendations and rulings. To prevent the losing party from 
misinterpreting the covered agreements in the implementation of the DSB 's 
recommendations and rulings, the DSB should be able to consult and make 
recommendations to the party during the implementation period. 
The DSU stipulates that if the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within 
a reasonable period of time, the losing party may compensate the winning party. 
Alternatively, if the parties fail to agree on the compensation, the winning party may 
ask for authorisation from the DSB to suspend its concessions and other obligations 
under the covered agreements to the losing party.71These measures, however, should 
69 
70 
71 
The WTO Understanding, above n25, art.21 (5). 
Above n25, art.21 (6). 
Above n25, art. 22 (2). 
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not be preferred as a means of forcing the losing party to implement the rulings fully .72 
The parties should negotiate to reach mutually acceptable compensation.73 
However, it is doubtful whether the suspension of concessions or trade sanctions 
would deter the losing party.74 Moreover, "accordng to economic theory, the 
imposition of trade sanctions is self defeating: it harms primarily the country which 
imposes them. "75 
Furthermore, in international intellectual property or TRIPs disputes between 
developed and developing countries, the possibility of suspending concessions given 
to developing countries may destructively damage these countries' economic interests. 
For example, in TRIPs dispute between the United States and Indonesia concerning 
Indonesian automobiles the United States may retaliate against the Indonesian 
Government's measures by suspending its concession of the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) to Indonesia. This GSP keeps the prices of Indonesian products 
such as textiles reasonable enough to enter the United States markets. Suspending this 
privilege would increase the prices of the products. This might also increase the 
production cost and as a consequence, Indonesian products would have no competitive 
advantages in the United States' markets. Ultimately, this would make the Indonesian 
companies go bankrupt. 
Moreover, as the users of technology and consumers of intellectual property products 
from developed countries, developing countries may potentially become the losing 
parties. If the TRIPs is strictly imposed on those countries' domestic legislation, many 
companies making counterfeit goods will close their business and consequently many 
workers will Jose their jobs. These damaging impacts become worst if developed 
countries retaliate or suspend their concessions to developing countries. 
The DSU directs that the suspension must be related to the same sector as the 
violation.76 If it is not effective, the winning party may suspend its concessions or 
other obligation in "other sectors under the same agreement". 77 In addition, if this 
measure is not effective and the situation becomes critical, suspension may be requested 
under other covered agreements.78The DSB must authorise the winning party to carry 
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out the suspension unless the former, by consensus, refuses to grant such 
authorisation. 79 
However, in certain circumstances the losing party may take revenge against the 
suspension of concessions or retaliation taken by the winning party. For example, in 
intellectual property disputes between China and the United States, China may cross 
retaliate the United States's measures by stopping its imports of the United States's 
products. 
Ultimately, the possibility of cross retaliating the measures taken by the losing party 
may weaken the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to enforce its 
agreements. As a result, this may cause an unjust international economic order and an 
unequal world trade system because only developed countries, who in fact have 
stronger economic and trade power, will effectively use cross retaliation measures. 
Developed countries may not suffer adverse economic impacts from developing 
countries' cross retaliation. 
B. Conclusion 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism (the DSU) may effectively resolve international 
intellectual property dispute between states. Its legalistic approaches may strictly 
enforce provisions of the TRIPs Agreement and other covered agrements of the WTO. 
As a result, these legalistic approaches and strong enforcement mechanisms may more 
adequately protect intellectual property rights. 
However, this mechanism may only be effective if there is a strong imbalance of power 
between the parties, for example between developed and developing countries. These 
may be political, economical and trade power imbalances. The mechanism may be less 
effective if the parties have relatively equal power. 
Thus, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may only benefit developed countries as 
the exporters and owners of intellectual property rights. In contrast, developing 
countries, as the importers of intellectual property products and the users of technology, 
will experience developmental stagnation from the strong enforcement of the TRIPs 
Agreement. Consequently, this will create an unequal and injustice world trade system. 
Therefore, enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement and protection of intellectual property 
rights through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should promote the development 
79 The WTO Understanding, art.22 (6), above n25. 
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of developing countries fairly. Strict enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement should not 
be "used to extract monopolistic rents from users, ... ,to the clear disadvantage of 
economic development in the less technogically advanced countries. "80 
V.THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION 
(WIPO) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE WIPO MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES 
The WIPO mediation and arbitration rules are specifically designed for the resolution of 
international intellectual property disputes. These rules are administered by the WIPO 
Arbitration Centre. This Centre functions as an administrative unit of the International 
Bureau of WIP0. 81The uses of these procedures are open to both individuals and 
enterprises, regardless of their nationality or domicile. A state may also use these 
procedures. 82 
This Part analyses and examines the effectiveness of these Rules in settling international 
intellectual property disputes. The criteria for the examination can be formulated in three 
questions. First, does the mechanism effectively support and have the capacity to 
achieve the WIPO objective that is 'to promote intellectual property protection 
throughout the world'? Secondly, is the mechanism able to produce 'a mutually 
acceptable solution to the disputes' and meet the private party's business interests? 
Finally, if the disputes involve developing countries, does the mechanism promote the 
development interests of those countries? 
A. Mediation RulesB 3 
The Rules consist of 27 articles. These, essentially, regulate the scope of the rules, 
appointment of the mediator, representation and participation of the parties, conduct of 
the mediation, role of the mediator, confidentiality and termination of the mediation. 
80 
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The Rules will govern the mediation process only when the parties to a dispute agree, 
in their mediation agreement, 84 to use these Rules in settling their dispute. 85So, it is 
important that the parties' mediation agreement should be the basis for settling the 
parties' dispute. The parties' choices and preferences in settling their disputes should be 
respected. The Rules should not diminish the parties' autonomy to produce a mutually 
dispute settlement. The parties know what they want fairly. Therefore, the Rules should 
create a conducive climate to assist the parties solve their problems and make 
compromises. Ultimately, the Rules should be able to meet the parties' interests. 
The parties have autonomy to appoint a mediator. However, if the parties do not do so 
or they do not agree on an alternative procedure for the appointment, the Centre must 
appoint the mediator.86 This procedure may be problematic. What if the parties do not 
agree on the Centre appointed mediator? One party may suspect the impartiality of such 
a mediator. To solve this problem, the Centre should respect the parties' values and 
preferences in choosing a mediator. For example, if international intellectual property 
disputes involve Indonesia and the United States, the Centre should not appoint a 
mediator from the United Kingdom since the United States and the United Kingdom 
may have the same political and economic agenda and objectives in their intellectual 
property policy. Even though the mediator is a private person, he or she may be 
influenced by his or her government's pressures or country's interests. So, it is 
important that the Rules should develop a mechanism that secures the impartiality of the 
mediator. 
The parties may agree on the manner in which the mediation will be conducted. 
However, in the absence of such agreement, the mediator must determine this 
issue. 87This rule may also be questioned: to what extent may the mediator determine 
this issue so that the parties' autonomy is still respected? Whatever methods the 
mediator uses, he or she should consider the parties' objectives and interests fairly. 
The mediator should promote the achievement of these objectives. If the dispute 
involves developing countries, the mediator should take into account the policy 
objective of those countries in the development and protection of intellectual property. 
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The parties' cooperation and good faith are the keys to the expeditious advancement of 
the mediation. 88In international patent licence dispute, for example, expeditious 
advancement of the mediation depends on the licensor and licensee in keeping the 
secrecy of trade secrets and confidential information which were disclosed during the 
mediation process. This information may be the key element to resolving the dispute. 
The owner of the trade secret or confidential information may not want to disclose the 
information if he or she distrusts his or her counterpart's intention to keep the secrecy 
of the information. 
To build effective cooperation, the parties should be able to distance their 
unconstructive emotions or sentiment from the problem during the mediation process. 
Furthermore, the parties should be able to "gain control over their situation and to 
understand and be understood by the other party." 89The parties should work together 
to focus on and solve the problems. One party should aid its counterpart to reach a 
solution that meets the interests of its counterpart. They should cooperate to produce a 
mutually acceptable solution. 
The Rules allow the mediator to communicate separately with the parties but the 
information given in such communication must not be disclosed to the other 
party.90This separate communication may be preferable in international intellectual 
property disputes. A party may not want to disclose its trade secrets at the present of 
another party. There may be hidden agenda, strategies or interests of the party that it 
prefers not to communicate to another party. There may also be unconstructive 
emotions that may impede the effectiveness of the mediation or negotiation process 
between the parties. In the separate communication the mediator, as a neutral third 
party, should persuade the parties to disclose this information. 
However, separate communication between the mediator and the parties may affect the 
impartiality of the mediator. How and to what extend can the mediator communicate 
separately with the parties? The party which communicates separately with the 
mediator may attempt to influence the mediator's integrity. On the other hand, the 
party which is not present at the separate communication may not be able to assess the 
integrity of the mediator. This separate communication decreases the ability of this 
party to control the outcome of the process. This is not conducive to the creation of a 
mutually acceptable solution. 
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After his or her appointment, the mediator, in consultation with the parties, must fix the 
timetable for each party's submission to the mediator of a statement "summarising the 
background of the dispute, the party's interests and contentions in relation to the dispute 
and the present status of the dispute ... , to enable the issues in the dispute to be 
identified" .91 Thus, the Rules give flexibility to the mediator to fix the timetable. This 
flexibility and the consultation with the parties over fixing the timetable play a 
substantial part in the resolution of international intellectual property disputes. Since the 
contents of the submission would determine the outcome of the settlement, the parties 
should have reasonable time to prepare the submission carefully. When fixing the 
timetable, the mediator should particularly consider the special circumstances and 
difficulties of the parties. Depending on these special circumstances, the mediator may 
give a party more time to prepare its submission adequately . 
However, the Rules do not set a time limit for the mediator to fix such a timetable. This 
may delay the mediation process. A reasonable time limit is needed to avoid such 
delays. For example in patent disputes concerning parallel importation of perishable 
goods, a delay of the mediation process may damage the interests of the owner of the 
goods. 
However, there may be disadvantages to strictly limiting the timetable for the party's 
submission. These may occur if the timetable does not properly consider the parties' 
special circumstances. Consequently, the parties may not prepare the submission 
carefully. This affects the outcome of the process. As a result, the parties may not be 
able to adequately create a mutually acceptable solution. Therefore, expeditious 
procedures should not jeopardise the quality of the mediation outcome. 
The Rules determining the role of the mediator:92 
... The mediator shall promote the settlement of the issues in dispute between the parties in any 
manner that the mediator believes to be appropriate, but shall have no authority to impose a 
settlement on the parties. 
However, to what extent can the role of the mediator to promote the settlement of 
dispute be justified? What criteria are used for such justification? The role and power of 
the mediator should be clearly defined. Mediators tend t o abuse their power if this 
power and mediation process are not 'ruled':93 
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The fundamental flaw is that, because of its lack of formality and structure, mediation cannot 
adequately regulate third-party interventions and even tends to encourage abuse. Without rules of 
law guiding mediators' response to parties' issues, mediators can alter the very terms of disputes 
that the parties themselves have framed. 
Ideally, the mediator should be able to create a climate in which the parties can develop 
their creativity by inventing options to work together toward reaching a mutually 
acceptable solution. The mediator should assist the parties to solve their problems. He 
or she shouldfacilitate effective communication between the parties. The mediator 
should also facilitate the parties' negotiation process. In short, the mediator controls the 
mediation process in order to help the parties produce a mutually acceptable solution. 
However, can a mediator propose settlement of a dispute? This depends on the parties' 
agreement and how far the mediator's proposal may affect the impartiality of the 
mediaton process. One party may be more comfortable with the mediator's proposal 
than with the counterpart's proposal. The mediator's proposal could be more impartial 
and objective. 
It is important that the mediator should be neutral in his or her proposal, but this may 
be difficult. Therefore, to prevent the mediator from becoming partial, the parties and 
the mediator should define the criteria for impartiality. The mediator's role and proposal 
should not go beyond these boundaries. 
The Rules allow for the use of other procedures. Having considered the parties' 
business relationship and interests, if the mediation is not appropriate, the mediator 
may propose other means or procedures for resolving the dispute which is 11 ••• most 
efficient, least costly and most productive ... 11 • 94In this proposal, the mediator may 
offer arbitration where the mediator will, with the parties' agreement', arbitrate the 
dispute; the mediator may use the information disclosed during mediation in the arbitral 
proceedings. 95 
The possibility of using other procedures is preferable in resolving international 
intellectual property disputes. Mediation may only be effective if the parties have 
formerly established a mutually beneficial relationship and want to continue this 
relationship. For example in trademark licence disputes between franchisor and 
franchisee, the franchisor may not want to litigate the case. The franchisor, who may be 
a foreign company, depends on the franchisee -who has a better knowledge of the 
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domestic market- when marketing his or her products. Litigating or arbitrating the case 
may destroy this relationship. 
On the other hand, mediation may not be preferable if there is no existing business 
relationship. For instance, the owner of copyrighted books should not mediate with a 
publisher who reproduces the books without his or her authorisation. The owner 
should litigate the dispute through courts. These adversial and open court proceedings 
may deter other publishers from doing the same illegal reproduction of the books. 
The Rules allow for the possibility of changing the mediator's role into an arbitrator's 
role during the mediation process. The information disclosed during the mediation 
process may also be used in the arbitral proceedings. However, this changed role may 
be problematic. If the parties do not disclose the important information, which was 
disclosed in the mediation, can the arbitrator require the parties to disclose such 
information? For example in a patent licence dispute where the owner of the patent had 
disclosed the trade secret to the mediator- who then becomes the arbitrator- in the 
separate caucus, can the arbitrator require the owner of the patent to disclose this trade 
secret? 
The owner of the patent may not want to disclose the trade secret in the arbitral 
proceedings. Disclosing the trade secret in the arbitration proceedings may jeopardise 
the secrecy of the information. To solve this problem, the parties should agree on the 
extent to which the arbitrator could require the information disclosed in the mediation to 
be used in the arbitral proceedings. The previous mediation process should not 
prejudice the parties' rights in the arbitral proceedings. 
The Rules emphasis the importance of the confidentiality of the mediation proceeding. 
The Rules order all the persons involved in the process not to make records of, use or 
disclose the information to third parties.96The confidentiality is important to resolve 
international intellectual property disputes effectively . The parties may not disclose the 
confidential information if the confidentiality of the mediation process is not guaranteed. 
There are three possibilities for terminating the mediation. 97 First, the parties may 
terminate the proceeding by signing a settlement agreement covering part of or all the 
issues in the dispute. Second, the mediator may also terminate the mediation if he or she 
96 
97 
The WIPO Mediation Rules, above n83, arts. I 4, 15 and 16. 
Above n83, art.IS. 
34 
thinks the proceeding is not worth continuing. Finally, due to the parties' autonomy, a 
party may, at any time, declare the termination. 
In short, the Mediaton Rules may enable the parties to produce a mutually acceptable 
solution to their dispute. These Rules are designed to satisfy the parties' interests. The 
parties can, at any time, withdraw from the mediation if it does not fulfill their interests. 
However, in some places these Rules need to be improved. 
B. Arbitration Rules98 
The WIPO Arbitration Rules consist of 78 articles and contain substantial provisions on 
the use of arbitration to resolve international commercial disputes, particularly in the 
settlement of international intellectual property disputes. These Rules govern, inter alia, 
the composition and establishment of the tribunal, conduct of the arbitration, the awards 
and confidentiality of the proceedings. 
The Rules would only be applied if the parties, in their arbitration agreement,99 agree to 
submit their dispute to these Rules. 100In international commercial transactions which 
exploit intellectual property rights, the parties may insert arbitration clauses in their 
contract. This functions as a preventive measure to resolve future disputes. 
Moreover, the parties may prefer to use international arbitration, "since only through 
international arbitration can a neutral body of jurisdiction be created" .101 The parties, 
however, may only choose to arbitrate some legal aspects of the transaction. For 
example, the parties may agree to arbitrate an intellectual property dispute if it does not 
contain trade secrets or confidential information. 
The Rules must not be used to govern the arbitration if they contradict the domestic law 
applicable to the arbitration that cannot be set aside by the parties.102Each country has a 
different policy in the subject matter of arbitration law. However, most countries 
98 
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"protect parties against oppressive measures".103 A country, for instance, may 
prohibit tthe arbitration of patent disputes concerning the compulsory licensing of the 
patent. As the arbitral awards will be executed through domestic courts, the Rules 
should respect the arbitration laws of the respective countries. 
The parties may be represented or assisted by persons of their choice.I 04 In 
international intellectual property disputes, the parties should be represented by lawyers 
who are knowledgable in the legal and technical aspects of the disputes. 
The parties may determine the number of arbitrators.105If there is no agreement 
between the parties on the composition of the tribunal, the arbitration must be governed 
by a sole arbitrator or three arbitrators if the Centre, in its discretion, considers 
appropriate.I 06 
However, there may be a problem about the impartiality and independence of arbitrators 
who are appointed by the Centre. The arbitrators may be influenced by the interests and 
objectives of the Centre. These interests may contradict with the parties' business 
interests. As the running of the Centre is financed by its incomes from the arbitration 
service, the Centre may abuse its power. Therefore the parties should be able to 
challenge such appointments. 
It is important that " [ e Jach arbitrator shall be impartial and independent" .107 
Furthermore, any arbitrator must disclose to the parties if there are circumstances, 
during arbitration proceedings, that "might give rise to justifiable doubt as to any 
arbitrator's impartiality and independence ... " 108 The impartiality of the arbitrators is 
the key factor in effective resolution of international intellectual property disputes. 
Therefore, there should be a mechanism to maintain the impartiality of the arbitrators 
during the arbitration proceedings. However, there should be no ambiguity and wide 
discretion of the arbitratorsto interpret the meaning of 'justifiable doubt'. 
A party may challenge any arbitrator if it has reasonable grounds for doubting the 
arbitrator's impartiality and independence. 109 The Centre has discretion to make a final 
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decision "[i]f the other party does not agree to the challenge and the challenged 
arbitrator does not withdraw" .110Moreover, the Centre may release an arbitrator from 
the appointment if the parties so requested or on its own judgement, "if the arbitrator 
has become de jure or de facto unable to fulfil, or fails to fulfil, the duties of an 
arbitrator" .111 
The provisions give wide discretion to the Centre to maintain the impartiality of the 
arbitrators. This may lessen the parties' autonomy to control the process. What if the 
the Centre's decision to release or to continuously employ an arbitrator injures the 
parties' rights, even though the parties opposed such a decision? Who will be 
financially responsible for the delays caused by the Centre's decision? 
In international intellectual property disputes the released arbitrator may disclose the 
confidential information to third parties: if the Centre's decision was previously 
opposed by the parties, can it be legally responsible for such disclosure ? Such 
Centre's decision may unfavourably affect the outcome, which may not be accepted by 
the parties, of the arbitration proceedings. It may be preferable for the Centre not to 
have wide discretion in assessing the impartiality of the arbitrators. 
In addition the Rules give the Tribunal wide discretion and power to control the 
arbitration proceedings. The Tribunal has discretion over the way the arbitration will be 
conducted.I 12The Centre must decide the place of arbitration if no such an agreement 
was made by the parties.113Subject to the power of the Tribunal to determine on the 
contrary, the parties have autonomy to choose the language of arbitration.11 4All these 
provisions lessen the parties' autonomy to control the arbitration proceedings. 
In deciding the place of arbitration the Centre should carefully assess the arbitration law 
of the country where the dispute is arbitrated. For example, in an international patent 
dispute a country may prohibit the arbitration concerning the validity of a patent. 
Consequently, the arbitral award may be set aside if this award contradicts the country's 
law. 
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Furthermore, the substantive law of the place of arbitration will govern the contents of 
the dispute. Therefore, it is important that the Centre should choose a state where its 
intellectual property laws are neutral and beneficial for both parties. 
Like a court, the Tribunal may order interim measures. l 15The Tribunal also has power 
to determine the evidence and to order a party to produce documents for such purpose 
during the arbitration. 116 Furthermore, in certain conditions the Tribunal may require a 
party to disclose confidential information. l l 7 
Interim measures, such as injunctions are needed in the resolution of international 
intellectual property disputes. For example, in trademark disputes, these interim 
measures are effective in order to stop the defendant reproducing counterfeit goods. 
These are also useful for preventing perishable goods from decreasing in value. 
However, in practice, these provisional measures should be executed through national 
courts and "in the international context, these courts may not always be neutral, 
experienced, or authorized by their own laws to grant adequate relief" . 118 Therefore, it 
is important that the parties should study the respective state's laws before they make an 
arbitration agreement. 
In practice the power of the Tribunal to order the parties to produce evidence may delay 
the arbitration proceedings. Moreover, the Tribunal, for example, cannot directly ask 
for the defendant's financial information from a bank in the place of the arbitration. The 
Tribunal should ask for assistance from the local courts. The bureaucracy of the courts 
for processing such requests may delay the arbitration proceedings. To avoid such 
delays, the Tribunal should be given power to directly require the local authorities to 
produce such evidence or information. 
The Rules allow a party to request the Tribunal to conduct a hearing for presentation of 
evidence by witnesses, including expert witnesses. 119For instance, in patent disputes 
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containing complex technical aspects expert witnesses are needed to resolve the disputes 
effectively. 
However, there should be equal opportunities for the parties to request expert 
witnesses. It is most likely that a party with strong financial resources would 'win' the 
case because it could hire the best experts to support its arguments. On the other hand, 
a party with inadequate financial resources may not even be able to pay expert 
witnesses. In fact, a "settlement is also a function of the resources available to each 
party ... those resources are frequently distributed unequally."120To produce a fairer 
award, this problem should be resolved. 
The Tribunal may continue the arbitration proceedings and grant an award if a party, 
without reasonable causes, fails to present its case.1 21 These ex parte proceedings may 
adversely damage the absent party's rights. Therefore, the Tribunal should not be given 
wide discretion and power to decide ex parte proceedings. There should be clearly 
determined reasons for the Tribunal to make such decisions. 
The Rules state that the law chosen by the parties must be referred to as a basis for the 
Tribunal to decide the substance of the dispute.1 22Unless the parties agree otherwise 
and such an agreement is allowed by the law of the place of arbitration, the arbitration 
must be governed by the arbitration law of the place of arbitration.123 
The parties' autonomy to choose the law is one of the advantages of using arbitration to 
settle their dispute. For example in international patent disputes they can choose the law 
of a state which gives adequate protection to foreign patent rights and protects their 
business interests. 
The Rules stipulate that in arbitration consisting of more than one arbitrator an award 
must be made by a majority, unless the parties determine otherwise. 124 However, the 
presiding arbitrator must make the award if such a majority is not reached. 125 
It is most likely that the arbitrators who are appointed by the parties would serve the 
parties' interests and less impartial. Consequently, they may have strong disagreements 
on certain points of view. Therefore, the presiding arbitrator, who makes final 
120 Owen M. Fiss "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Y.L.J. 1076. 
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decisions, must have strong personal integrity and be more qualified than the other 
arbitrators. 
The arbitration proceedings and the final award should be made within 12 months. The 
award is final and binding and the parties are waived their right to appeal to courts or 
other judicial authorities.126 
Waiving the parties' right to appeal the award may unfairly damage the parties' 
interests. Arbitration is not always perfect. The arbitrators may be partial and abuse 
their power. The parties may act in bad faith. The arbitration procedures may be unfair. 
Ultimately, the award may not fairly protect the parties' interests. 
In the final analysis, arbitration may only give advantages to the parties if its procedures 
and structures are able to produce a fair solution. Furthermore, the arbitrators must be 
impartial and qualified persons. Adherence to a timetable should not put the quality of 
the award in jeopardy. 
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF THE WTO AND WIPO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSU) has more legalistic approaches than the 
WIPO dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO mechanism works like a state's court. 
It has a strong enforcement mechanism. The losing party must implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB otherwise it will face trade sanctions or 
retaliation from the winning party. 
Moreover, the panel has an investigative function. It may seek information within the 
jurisdiction of a state party. The panel may ask for documents from local authorities of 
that state as evidence for the panel process. When threatened by trade sanctions or 
retaliation from the winning state party, the losing state party has no choice but to 
provide such information. 
The DSU gives strong power to the DSB, ensuring the losing party's compliance with 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings. This body can undertake surveillances in the 
territory of the losing state party to 'psychologically force' the losing party to comply 
with its recommendations and rulings. Ultimately, the DSB can authorise the winning 
126 WIPO Arbitration Rules, above n98, art.64 (a) 
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party to retaliate or sanction the losing party if this party does not comply with its 
recommendations and rulings. 
The DSU strictly limits the time period for the settlement of disputes. This makes the 
parties unable to control the process. The parties must settle their disputes within this 
time framework. However, this strict time limitation may avoid delays in the dispute 
settlement process. 
Even though the DSU gives the parties opportunities to negotiate their dispute during 
the panel process, this negotiation process must be done within the time framework. 
The parties cannot modify this time framework . Thus, the DSU lessens the parties' 
ability to control the process . 
Furthermore, the DSU also reduces the party's autonomy to control the outcome of the 
process. They must not agree or produce a settlement which in practice is not consistent 
with the provisions of the covered agreements. For example, if the disputes involve 
intellectual property, they must settle their disputes within the framework of the TRIPs 
Agreement or other intellectual property conventions. Moreover, even though the 
parties have mutually accepted a settlement, this may be set aside or modified if the 
implementation of this settlement would be likely to harm the interests of other member 
states of the WTO. 
The legalistic approaches of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism could be 
understood as an effort of the WTO to effectively enforce the provisions of the covered 
agreements within the domestic policies of its member states. This may enable the WTO 
to achieve its objectives. As a consequence, the parties must not agree on a settlement 
that is not consistent with the objectives of the WTO. The possibility of producing a 
mutually acceptable settlement , therefore, is limited by and must not contradict the 
objectives of the WTO and the interests of other state members of the WTO. 
In contrast the WTO, the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism gives more discretion 
and autonomy to the parties to settle their disputes. This mechanism is specifically 
designed for meeting both private and state parties' interests. Therefore, the parties are 
given more options and flexibility in designing and modifying the structures and 
procedures of the mechanism. 
Furthermore, the parties can at any time withdraw from the mediation if they think they 
cannot benefit from this procedure. Moreover, the parties can freely agree on the 
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manner in which the mediation will be conducted. Therefore, the party has more ability 
to control the outcome of the mediation. 
However, the parties will lose their ability to control the outcome if they arbitrate their 
dispute under the WIPO Arbitration Rules. The Tribunal will control the process and 
the outcome of the arbitration. Moreover, because of the contractual nature of 
arbitration, courts may intervene in the arbitral process.127 
Despite the differences, however, both the WTO and WIPO dispute settlement 
mechanisms emphasis the importance of the confidentiality in the settlement of disputes. 
All the parties or persons involved in the disputes must keep the confidentiality of the 
process and the outcome of the proceedings. 
In the final analysis, if the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is applied in 
international intellectual property disputes, it may resolve intellectual property disputes 
between states more effectively. Its legalistic approaches and strong enforcement 
mechanism will 'force' the losing state party to comply with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. 
However, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism fails to protect the interests of 
developing countries if the intellectual property disputes involve developing and 
developed countries. This is because of the imbalance of economic, political and trade 
power between those countries. As a result, developed countries would use trade 
sanctions and retaliation more effectively than developing countries if the disputes 
involved those countries. 
Therefore, it is better for developing countries to settle their intellectual property dispute 
through the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism. This mechanism addresses the 
imbalance of power between the parties more fairly . The parties have more flexibility to 
choose their own settlement. Ultimately, this would enable developing countries to 
produce a settlement that meets their development interests. 
127 Amazu A. Asozu "A Threat To Arbitral Integrity" (1995) 12 J. Int'l Arb.159. 
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VII. CASE STUDY 
A case study is a useful method of assessing the effectiveness of a dispute settlement 
mechanism. An analysis of the case would identify the weaknesses and strengths of 
this mechanism in settling disputes. 
"Dunhill" Case 
This case was decided by the Central Jakarta District Court, under its decision Number 
542/1980 G, dated 21 August 1981. An analysis and discussion of this case will 
demonstrate whether an 'alternative' dispute resolution procedure is appropriate or may 
be more effective in resolving this kind of dispute. Since this case involves private 
parties, the discussion will focus on the analysis of the WIPO Mediation and 
Arbitration Rules. 
A. The Parties 
The Plaintiff was Mr. Richard Dunhill a Director of Alfred Dunhill Limited, a company 
incorporated and domiciled in England. The Defendant was Mrs.Lilin Sutan, domiciled 
in Jakarta 
B. The Facts and Arguments 
This case was about the unlawful use of well-known marks. 
The Plaintiff had registered his trademark and tradename called 'DUNHILL' in 
Indonesia under Number 81996 of 27 October 1965 for 'filtered cigarettes'. 
The Defendant also registered a mark named DUNHILL for 'watches and other timing 
instruments'. She registered this mark on 15 January 1980 under Number 142434. 
The Plaintiff claimed that he was the first user of the trademark and tradename of 
DUNHILL in Indonesia and in the world, therefore they had a sole right to use the 
marks in Indonesia. The Plaintiff argued that even though his products and the 
Defendant's were not of the same class, the use of the Defendant's mark might 
confuse the consumers. The consumers might think that the Defendant's products were 
produced by the Plaintiff or had some connection with the Plaintiffs products. 
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The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had intentionally and without good faith used 
his mark, which was well known to the consumers, to make a profit. Therefore, the 
Plaintiff requested the Court to declare that he was the first user of the DUNHILL mark 
and to cancel the Defendant's mark from the registration. 
On the other hand, the Defendant argued that the Trademark Law Number 21 of 1961 
only protected a mark used for goods of the same class. The Defendant contended that 
her products were not of the same class as the Plaintiffs. She claimed that the Plaintiff 
never registered the DUNHILL mark for 'watches and other timing instruments'. 
Furthermore, the Defendant argued that according to the Trademark Law 1961, a 
request for the cancellation of a mark must be lodged within nine months of the 
publication of the Defendant's mark. 
The Defendant rejected the Plaintiffs arguments that her products confused the 
consumers. She asserted that as her products did not contain the words 'Alfred Dunhill 
Ltd' but the words 'President Watch Coy, Indonesia', the consumers would not be 
misled. Therefore, the Defendant asked the Court to refuse the Plaintiffs demands. 
C. The Court's Opinion and Judgment 
The Court held that even though the Defendant's mark had differences in the letter 
configuration, it was essentially identical to the Plaintiffs mark when it was spelt out. 
Therefore it would mislead the consumers. 
The Court further argued that despite the fact that the nine months period for the 
cancellation of the Defendant' mark had elapsed, because of her bad faith the 
Defendant's mark could not be protected. 
In its decision, the Court declared that the Defendant's mark was similar to the 
Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court ordered the Patent and Copyright Office to cancel the 
Defendant's mark from its registration. 
D. Case Analysis. 
The elements of the case can be identified as follows: 
I.There was no previous business relationship between the parties; 
2.The Plaintiff seems to be in a strong legal position to win the case; 
3.The Defendant's wrong-doings had harmed the Plaintiffs business interests; 
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4.The Defendant may continue her illegal activities if not stopped; 
5.Both Plaintiff and Defendant registered the mark; and 
6.The Plaintiff may license the mark to the Defendant. 
From the Plaintiffs perspectives, therefore, it is better to litigate the case. This litigation 
may stop the Defendant continuing her illegal activities. This may also deter other 
persons or companies from doing the same act. If he wins the case, the Plaintiff will 
have a good precedent. Other advantages for litigating this case are to identify all the 
participants involved in those illegal activities and to prevent the Defendant and other 
persons from marketing the infringing goods.128 
However, the Plaintiff must have strong legal arguments to litigate the case. He must be 
sure that he will win the case as he will lose his trademark right if he loses. If the 
Plaintiff loses the case, he will be prohibited from using the mark and from marketing 
his products in Indonesia. 
Ultimately, it is not appropriate for the Plaintiff to refer the case to the WIPO Mediation 
and Arbitration Rules because the confidentiality of the WIPO dispute settlement 
mechanism may lessen the deterrent effects of the case. The Plaintiffs objectives are to 
stop the Defendant continuing her illegal activities, to deter other persons from illegally 
using his marks, and to establish a precedent. The WIPO dispute settlement mechanism 
does not accomodate these objectives. 
128 Hillary Pearson et al Commercial Exploitation of Intellectual Property (Blackstone Press Ltd, 
London, 1990) 223. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism fails to respond adequately to the needs and 
development interests of developing countries. This mechanism does not properly 
address the imbalance of power between developing and developed countries in the 
resolution of international intellectual property disputes. Consequently, the use of this 
mechanism would result in an unfair dispute settlement for developing countries as the 
weaker parties. 
Therefore, there is a need to reform the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This 
reform should have the ability to resolve international intellectual property disputes in a 
'win-win solution'. Moreover, it should fairly promote development interests of the 
state parties. More importantly, this reform should be able to create a just world trade 
system and an equal international economic order. 
On the other hand, the WIPO dispute settlement mechanism gives more autonomy and 
flexibility to the parties in in international intellectual property disputes to control the 
outcome of the dispute settlement process. In addition, this mechanism also more 
adequately addresses the imbalance of power between the parties. Ultimately, the use of 
this mechanism would be more likely to produce a mutually acceptable solution. 
Therefore, developing countries should better use the WIPO dispute settlement 
mechanism to resolve international intellectual property disputes. The flexibility of this 
mechanism would enable developing countries to produce a settlement that meets their 
development interests. 
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of a dispute settlement mechanism within an 
international organization should not be evaluated merely from the point of view of its 
strong enforcement mechanism. More fundamentally, such a mechanism must also 
have the ability to produce a settlement that promotes and protects development interests 
of the parties to a dispute, particularly the weaker parties from developing countries. 
Afterall, how can one say that a dispute settlement mechanism is effective when the 
implementation of its resolutions causes suffering for the people of developing 
countries? 
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